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STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
BLAKE HUDSON* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “environmental constitutionalism” may have a number of 
distinct meanings in different contexts.1  For the purpose of this symposium, 
environmental constitutionalism is framed as addressing the question of how 
constitutional provisions impact environmental quality and the environmental 
rights of citizens.  Importantly, this conception of environmental 
constitutionalism comes in at least two forms.  The first, and more typical 
conception, might be termed fundamental environmental constitutionalism—the 
primary form highlighted in this symposium.  Fundamental environmental 
constitutionalism often involves textual constitutional provisions protecting 
fundamental substantive or procedural citizen rights to a quality environment 
in national or subnational instruments.  Sometimes these textual provisions 
create new constitutional rights.  At other times, these provisions may codify 
common law principles of public rights to environmental health, as do the 
provisions of some state constitutions in the United States that reify public 
trust rights in water, air, wildlife, or other resources.2  For instance, consider 
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment, at issue in 
the recent Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania3 case: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of 
the environment.  Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come.  As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.4 
                                                                                                                           
* Professor of Law, Joint Appointment. LSU Law Center and LSU School of the Coast and 
Environment. I would like to thank the participants in the Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism symposium at Widener University School of Law for including me in the 
conference and for their feedback on this article (though analysis expressed in the article is my 
own). I would also like to thank the Widener Law Review for their hard work in preparing the 
article for publication. 
1 See Brian J. Gareau, Foreword: Global Environmental Constitutionalism, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 403, 403-04 (2013); Louis J. Kotzé, Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism, 1 
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 199, 203-04 (2012); Douglas A. Kysar, Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism: Getting There from Here, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 83, 90 (2012). 
2 See generally MICHAEL BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2013). 
3 Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
4 Id. at 913 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (commonly known as the “Environmental Rights 
Amendment”)). 
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A second form of environmental constitutionalism is equally important to 
the exercise of national and subnational environmental protection measures 
across the globe—that is, structural environmental constitutionalism, which is 
the allocation of environmental regulatory authority across levels of 
government within particular nations.  Structural environmental 
constitutionalism is particularly relevant in federal systems of government.  
Some federal nations constitutionally divide regulatory authority over certain 
environmental subject matter between national (federal) and subnational 
(state/provincial and local) governments.  This can create a number of 
constraints on environmental regulatory efforts at each level of government.5  
For example, subnational governments may constrain national environmental 
efforts by claiming that a regulatory realm is constitutionally reserved to the 
states, and is therefore legally protected from federal interference.6  On the 
other hand, national governments may preempt potentially efficacious state or 
local environmental regulatory efforts pursuant to claimed exclusive 
constitutional powers.7  
Importantly, structural constraints on environmental policymaking do not 
only arise out of national constitutions.  The same dynamic may take place 
within subnational jurisdictions if state or provincial constitutions limit local 
government efforts to create innovative environmental policies.  This may 
occur if state or provincial governments fail to constitutionally empower local 
governments to regulate in certain environmental areas, take back powers 
previously granted to local governments to do so, or legislatively preempt local 
government environmental regulatory efforts.8  Ultimately, constitutional 
design related to regulatory authority within national and subnational 
jurisdictions can be a structural form of environmental constitutionalism that 
may have as much, or more, impact than the protection of fundamental 
environmental rights within constitutional text.  
The regulatory divide across levels of government in federal nations may 
arise from explicit environmental constitutional text or, in its absence, 
implicitly from constitutional interpretation undertaken by the judiciary.  It 
may also arise, of course, via legislative preemption of lower levels of 
government pursuant to other constitutional powers that are not explicitly of 
an environmental nature.  I have previously highlighted these dynamics in the 
context of forest policy9 and land use planning10 in a number of federal 
                                                                                                                           
5 There are a number of additional scenarios in which this can play out. See Blake Hudson & 
Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and 
Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1292-1312 (2013). 
6 See id. at 1279.  Contrast this with subnational governments in unitary systems, which may 
not legally constrain environmental protection measures undertaken by the national 
government, even though political subdivisions in unitary systems may apply political pressure 
to shape national environmental policies or may be free to craft their own policies at the 
allowance of the national government. 
7 Id. at 1304.  
8 See id. at 1308-09.  
9 See generally Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363 (2011) [hereinafter Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism]; Blake 
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nations, concluding that certain constitutional designs in federal nations can 
negatively impact natural capital management across scales—that is—from 
local to global scales of governance.11  For example, state and provincial 
governments currently maintain virtually exclusive constitutional regulatory 
authority over subnationally controlled forests in the United States and Canada 
(which make up sixty-five and eighty-four percent of each nation’s forests, 
respectively).12  This can pose serious complications for national level forest 
policies that seek to harness subnational forests to combat climate change as 
land development activities in both countries are expected to reduce forest 
cover over the next several decades.13  Such forms of constitutional design can 
also complicate international agreements, as the federal governments in these 
nations may be unable to obligate subnational governments to certain potential 
requirements of global agreements related to forests.14  
This Article introduces this structural, but arguably less obvious, form of 
environmental constitutionalism by detailing its relationship with fundamental 
environmental constitutional textual provisions, and by describing some of the 
environmental ramifications of constitutional designs that do not optimally 
allocate regulatory authority across scales of government.  Part II details how 
both fundamental and structural environmental constitutionalism may be 
contained in explicit constitutional text.  Part II further analyzes how both the 
likelihood of achieving textual changes within constitutions and the efficacy of 
such changes depend upon the type of governmental system involved (federal 
versus unitary), the level of government where textual changes are sought 
(national versus state constitutions), and the type of environmental 
constitutionalism sought to be achieved (fundamental versus structural).  Part 
III discusses how structural constitutionalism, in particular, is also embodied 
within judicial interpretation of other constitutional provisions, while Part IV 
details how it may manifest through legislative instruments.  Part V briefly 
details the promises and perils of structural environmental constitutionalism 
and its implications for achieving the goals of environmental constitutionalism 
generally—a different set of implications than those presented by fundamental 
environmental constitutionalism.  Part VI briefly concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                           
Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 925 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change]; Blake 
Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, 
87 IND. L.J. 1455 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change]. 
10 See generally Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons 
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, The Keystone of 
Nested Commons Governance]; Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 1291. 
11 See generally BLAKE HUDSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMONS: THE IMPACT OF 
FEDERAL GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2014). 
12 Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 9, at 931-32. 
13 Id. at 932-33. 
14 Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism, supra note 9, at 385. 
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II.  CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT: FUNDAMENTAL VERSUS STRUCTURAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The most straightforward forms of fundamental or structural 
environmental constitutionalism are contained in explicit constitutional text 
providing, respectively, citizen rights to a quality environment or allocating 
regulatory authority over certain environmental subject matter to particular 
levels of government.15  Many national and subnational constitutions already 
contain environmental constitutionalism in some form or another.16  Other 
participants at this symposium have discussed at length national and 
subnational constitutions that contain fundamental environmental 
constitutionalism.  Yet nations also maintain a wide spectrum of approaches to 
structural environmental constitutionalism regarding specific resources. 
Consider an example from the forest management sector.  Canada’s 
constitution explicitly allocates subnational forest management policy authority 
to the provinces, with no prescriptive role for the national government.17  In 
contrast, Brazil, Russia, and India all maintain national constitutions 
containing explicit constitutional text allocating ultimate national and 
subnational forest management authority to the national government.18 
Though many constitutions already contain explicit fundamental or 
structural environmental constitutional provisions, to the extent that 
environmental constitutionalism is a growing phenomenon, governments may 
attempt to strengthen those forms or otherwise adjust them through 
constitutional amendment to achieve more effective or balanced 
environmental governance.  Both national and state constitutions can be 
difficult to amend to incorporate either fundamental or structural 
environmental constitutionalism.  Yet, just how difficult depends upon, first, 
whether the governmental system is federal or unitary, and second, whether it 
is the national or the state government that is seeking to amend its 
constitution.  Once an amendment is passed, the next important question is 
whether it will be viable in achieving environmental protection goals.  This 
question implicates whether the amendment is aimed at fundamental versus 
structural constitutionalism.  Each of these three binary categories is discussed 
in turn below. 
 
A.  Federal versus Unitary 
 
Amending national constitutions in unitary systems is typically not as 
difficult as doing so in federal systems (at least from a legal perspective) since 
only one body politic must coordinate to pass a constitutional amendment in a 
                                                                                                                           
15 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
16 See David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment, ENV’T, July/Aug. 2012, 
at 4 (providing a map identifying nations that recognize the right to a healthy environment in 
constitutions, legislation, or international agreements). 
17 See Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1497. 
18 Id. at 1491-92, 1500, 1502. 
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unitary system.  In federal systems, however, state or provincial governments 
not only have political interests at stake in any national constitutional 
amendment, but these subnational governments maintain legally guaranteed 
participation in the amendment process.  States or provinces, therefore, may 
legally thwart efforts to undertake constitutional amendment at the national 
level.  
In the United States, for example, citizens have made over ten thousand 
attempts to amend the national Constitution.19  Only a handful of 
amendments have passed, in large part because of the difficulties posed by the 
Article V amendment process.  Under that process, an amendment must be 
proposed by either two-thirds of both houses (the Senate or House of 
Representatives) or two-thirds of state governments, and then it must be 
ratified by three-quarters of state governments.20  
Similarly, the Canadian national constitution has only been amended ten 
times since Canada was officially vested with the power to amend its 
constitution in 1982.21  Most of these amendments are aimed at province-
specific issues,22 and the citizenry has trended toward using the amendment 
process to vest more powers in the provinces rather than the national 
government.23  Further, Canada’s amending procedure was not unanimously 
agreed upon by the provinces, as Quebec raised questions as to its legitimacy.24  
Due to fears of illegitimacy, courts have refused to interpret, or even 
acknowledge, certain Canadian amendments.25  Even if considered legitimate, 
it is virtually impossible to pass an amendment that binds the provinces 
entirely.  For some amendments, two-thirds of the provinces must agree, 
including at least fifty percent of the population,26 and provinces may opt out 
of adopting an amendment that all other provinces agree to merely by passing 
a resolution opposing the amendment within one year.27  
The amendment processes in these federal systems demonstrate the 
difficulty of amending national constitutions when subnational governments 
                                                                                                                           
19 RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE 
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993); see JOHN R. 
VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND 
AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–1995 363–80 (1996); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Amending the 
Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 679 (1990). 
20 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
21 Prior to 1982, the amendment power had been with the British government.  Kevin 
Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context—A Legal Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1357, 1366 
(1993).   
22 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).  
23 Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations: 
Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1439 (1994).   
24 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.); Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking 
in Comparative Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 193, 222 (2008). 
25 Choudhry, supra note 24, at 227. 
26 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part V, § 38(1)(b) of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
27 Id. at § 38(3). 
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maintain constitutionally protected legal inputs into the amendment process.  
Achieving either fundamental or structural environmental constitutional 
changes in these systems, therefore, is fraught with more legal difficulties than 
achieving them in unitary systems. 
 
B.  National Versus State Constitutions 
The operation of state and provincial governments in federal systems 
approximates that of national governments in unitary systems and, therefore, 
state and provincial governments are more readily capable of achieving 
constitutional amendment.  States and provinces, of course, have local 
governments within their borders (municipalities, counties, and other 
subnational units), which in turn maintain legal authority.  However, that legal 
authority typically arises solely from the state or provincial governments.  
In both the U.S. and Canada, for example, local governments do not exist 
under national constitutions (as do the states and provinces), but rather they 
are created out of state or provincial constitutional authority.  In this way, as 
with unitary systems, local governments only maintain as much power as the 
state or provincial government gives them, which conceivably could be no 
legal authority at all.  State governments in the United States, for example, 
must empower local governments legislatively or constitutionally through the 
grant of “home rule” or pursuant to “Dillon’s Rule,” and remain free to 
withhold or take back some of that power through preemption.28  State 
governments therefore also may operate as one body politic when undertaking 
constitutional amendment to incorporate or adjust fundamental or structural 
environmental constitutionalism.  In this way, achieving either fundamental or 
structural environmental constitutionalism through constitutional amendment 
is an easier legal task at the state or provincial level than at the national level.  
 
C.  Fundamental Versus Structural Constitutionalism 
 
Notwithstanding the uncertain political probability of passing or amending 
constitutional provisions related to the environment—at either the national or 
state/provincial level—there are many ways in which national or subnational 
constitutions could conceivably be amended to affect environmental rights 
and regulations and to achieve either fundamental or structural environmental 
constitutionalism.  The effectiveness of such an amendment in actually 
achieving environmental goals may depend in large part on the type of 
environmental constitutionalism sought to be achieved.  First, consider 
fundamental constitutionalism. 
J.B. Ruhl has provided a useful analytical tool for assessing the viability of 
fundamental environmental constitutional provisions, specifically seeking to 
assess the utility of an “environmental quality amendment” (EQA).29  As 
                                                                                                                           
28 Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 1308-09. 
29 J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality 
Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 248-49 (1999). 
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described by Ruhl, EQAs tend to be aspirational, broad, and include language 
such as: “[t]he natural resources of the nation are the heritage of present and 
future generations.  The right of each person to clean and healthful air and 
water, and to the protection of other natural resources of the nation, shall not 
be infringed by any person.”30  These amendments may be assessed based 
upon their function (the institutional purpose of the amendment) and their 
target (the societal interaction adjusted by the functional change).31  The 
potential functions include whether the amendment: (1) alters the operational 
rules of government; (2) prohibits specified government action; (3) creates or 
affirms individual rights; or (4) expresses aspirational goals.32  The targets of 
the function may be: (1) intra- and intergovernmental relations; (2) relations 
between the government and its citizens; or (3) relations between citizens.33   
Ruhl determined that EQAs fall into a category not currently represented 
within the United States Constitution, since it would be an amendment 
establishing aspirational goals (function 4) aimed at citizen-citizen relations 
(target 3).34  These types of amendments are just the types that Ruhl argues 
should not be included in the United States Constitution35 since they must 
necessarily be drafted either ambiguously broad or so narrowly that 
implementing them would be nearly impossible. 
Applying Ruhl’s matrix, the many state constitutions that contain public 
trust or similar provisions36 appear to establish aspirational goals (function 4) 
or even create or affirm individual rights (function 3) targeting the relationship 
between the government and its citizens (target 2) since the provisions seek to 
compel government protection of important resources.  If viewed as 
establishing aspirational goals (function 4), then these provisions may also lend 
themselves to the same criticisms levied by Ruhl against national amendments, 
in that they are ambiguous as to what protections must actually occur or what 
the remedy will be if protections are not put into place through legislative or 
judicial action.  Even so, if state provisions are viewed as creating or affirming 
citizens’ rights (function 3), by reifying common law concepts like the public 
trust doctrine, they can provide support for citizen judicial claims that states 
must meet their obligations to protect certain resources.37  The United States 
Constitution currently contains three amendments in this category.38  In this 
                                                                                                                           
30 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 248. 
31 Id. at 253.   
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 252 (“[A]ny EQA attempting to capture a normative statement about the 
environment and plug it into the United States Constitution is simply a bad idea.”).  
Furthermore, “amendments purporting to express aspirational values or regulate civil relations, 
or do both, should set off bells and whistles in the political evaluation process.” Id. at 260. 
36 See generally BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 2. 
37 See Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 954-56 (Pa. 2013); Bonser-Lain v. Texas 
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1-2 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Aug. 2, 2012), vacated, 438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2014). 
38 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 261 fig.1 (identifying Amendments Six, Seven, and Ten as creating 
or affirming citizens’ rights). 
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way, fundamental constitutionalism providing citizen rights to compel 
government action may be more efficacious, especially at the state level, than 
those criticized by Ruhl as ineffectual. 
While fundamental constitutionalism may lead to constitutional protections 
of environmental rights that are of varying degrees of effectiveness, these are 
not the only types of constitutional adjustments that can affect environmental 
quality.  In addition to amendments providing constitutionally protected 
individual rights to environmental welfare, other amendments might simply 
clarify or adjust regulatory authority over environmental resource management 
between levels of government.  Citizens may seek federal intervention into a 
resource management category dominated by state governments, such as land 
use regulation or direct forest management in the United States.  Or perhaps 
state governments wish to regulate certain subject matters free of federal 
preemption.  In these scenarios, a constitutional amendment could clarify that 
the federal government maintains regulatory authority over certain categories 
of resource management in addition to the states.  Or, an amendment could 
provide that the states will be able to regulate in certain resource management 
areas free from undermining federal interference.  These types of amendments 
would fall into a category far more likely to be viable according to Ruhl’s 
matrix.  
Take an example in the forest management context, where an amendment 
might simply declare: “The federal government of the United States maintains 
the authority to regulate, in addition to the states, the management of the 
nation’s forest resources; federally-owned, state-owned, and privately-owned.”  
This amendment would serve a function of altering the operational rules of 
government (function 1) and would adjust the target of intergovernmental 
relations (target 1).  Nine United States constitutional amendments currently 
fall under the “function 1, target 1” category of the matrix.39  In this way, the 
federal and state governments in the United States might one day agree to 
change the operational rules of government and the current status of 
intergovernmental relations by rebalancing federal-state roles in regulating 
forest management or other regulatory subject areas where one level of 
government is precluded from prescriptively regulating.  The same may occur 
at the state level, for example, if citizens would prefer more local control over 
the location of fracking activities within their states, rather than being 
preempted by state law,40 or if states want to prevent local governments from 
blocking citizen rights to utilize distributed solar or wind renewables on their 
rooftops.41   
Such an amendment may emerge as necessary since society may be unable 
to achieve some policies in the absence of an amendment.42  In the federal 
                                                                                                                           
39 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 261 fig.1 (identifying Amendments Twelve, Fourteen 
(Section Two), Seventeen, Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three, 
Twenty-Five, and Twenty-Seven). 
40 See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 936. 
41 See Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1242 (2010). 
42 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 270–71. 
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context, though the legislative process may be preferable to constitutional 
amendment so that the meaning of the Constitution does not become diluted 
and otherwise take the form of a legislative instrument, Ruhl asserts that:  
 
The question of need, therefore, is whether there is any 
institutional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely accepted 
social policy through routine legislative and judicial forums. . . . 
[S]ome amendments have forced an intransigent minority of states 
to come into line with the rest of the nation on fundamental social 
policy issues associated with matters traditionally (or 
constitutionally) left to state jurisdiction.  Where federal legislation 
cannot impose the policy over state resistance and the courts 
cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the stubborn 
states, an amendment is the only alternative.  These are examples 
of institutional necessity, where an amendment, and only an 
amendment, can allow the widely accepted social policy to move 
forward in society.43 
 
There are a number of institutional barriers to regulatory inputs into certain 
forms of natural capital regulation at various levels of government—barriers 
that arise out of federal and state constitutional and legislative provisions.44  As 
one example, the absence of adequate forest management standards in many 
states, especially in the southeastern United States, supports the idea that an 
amendment remedying exclusive state regulatory authority over subnational 
forest policy could be a last resort to overcoming that institutional barrier with a 
more effective policy approach.45  Indeed, some scholars have argued for 
constitutional amendments that rebalance the relationship between the United 
States federal government and the states in the presence of ineffective state 
environmental policymaking.46  These types of amendments would be “purely 
structural,” unlike a constitutional amendment providing for an individual’s 
right to a clean and healthy environment, and would “empower[] Congress to 
legislate regarding the environment”47 if it chose to do so.  These 
amendments, therefore, would not compel particular levels of government to 
legislate nor would any new fundamental constitutional rights be created for 
citizens.  The constitutional authority to regulate would merely be reallocated 
between levels of government. 
                                                                                                                           
43 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 271. 
44 See generally Hudson, The Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, supra note 9. 
45 See Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1686 (2014). 
46 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy 
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11018 (2004).  Professor Craig argues that “a 
constitutional amendment could allow Congress to reenact the federal environmental statutes 
pursuant to that amendment’s grant of legislative authority, freeing them of any lingering 
Commerce Clause limitations and leaving Congress free to reach the last federally unregulated 
impediments to environmental quality—such as nonpoint source pollution—currently deemed 
to be outside the federal regulatory sphere.” Id. at 11019–20. 
47 Dan L. Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to 
Preserve, Protect, and Promote The Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821, 823 (2005). 
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This discussion, of course, is not an assessment of the likelihood of such an 
amendment being passed.  Even though the type of structural amendment 
highlighted above may be the kind most likely to be effective if enacted, it 
remains incredibly difficult to convince three-quarters of the states to ratify an 
amendment that intrudes on state regulatory powers—and it remains that any 
kind of “constitutional environmental amendment is unlikely in the current 
political climate,” at least at the federal level.48  For the reasons discussed in 
Part II (B), it may be easier to craft such an amendment at the state or 
provincial government level or within unitary systems of government, which 
might act more readily, for example, to prevent local governments from 
barring the use of distributed renewables within their jurisdictions. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Structural environmental constitutionalism is not always embodied 
explicitly within constitutional text.  The judiciary, at both the state/provincial 
and national levels, plays a key role in interpreting both textual environmental 
constitutional provisions and explicitly non-environmental provisions of 
constitutions that, while not specifically addressing environmental subject 
matter, establish authority for such regulation.  For instance, the United States 
Congress cannot regulate unless it does so pursuant to one of its constitutional 
powers, such as the power to tax, make treaties, manage federal property, or to 
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several states[.]”49  This last power, the 
Commerce Clause, is the provision pursuant to which most federal 
environmental legislation is passed.  The Endangered Species Act of 1973,50 
the Clean Air Act,51 and the Clean Water Act,52 among a number of other 
federal statutes, were enacted under Commerce Clause authority.53  A number 
of constitutional tests have arisen to determine when Congress is acting 
pursuant to this power, including the “substantial effects” test, which asks 
whether Congress is regulating an economic activity that in the aggregate has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce (regardless of whether that activity is 
clearly interstate or completely intrastate).54  Interpretation of this provision 
has proven fertile ground for judicial wrangling over the scope of federal 
authority under the Commerce Clause and when federal exercise of that 
authority might begin to intrude on powers reserved for the states.55  
                                                                                                                           
48 Craig, supra note 46, at 11018. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
50 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).  
52 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
53 See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 
(2012). 
54 Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under 
the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2011). 
55 See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 746-47 
(2005); Eric Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs 
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In the judicial interpretation context, let us once again revisit our forest 
policy example.  Forests are not explicitly mentioned in the United States 
Constitution, as they are in the Canadian, Brazilian, Russian, and Indian 
constitutions.56  As a result, regulatory authority over subnational forest policy 
in the United States is up for judicial interpretation.  Currently, subnational 
governments in the United States maintain sole authority over subnational 
forest management because forests fall into the category of land use planning, 
long considered a regulatory role for state and local governments.57  
Furthermore, the United States federal government has never legislatively 
claimed authority over direct subnational forest management, so United States 
courts have not had a chance to adjust, through judicial interpretation, 
structural environmental constitutionalism related to United States forest 
policy.  
Contrast the United States with Australia, which also has a constitution that 
does not explicitly contemplate forest governance.  Australian courts have 
declared that all levels of government can maintain regulatory inputs into 
forest management at any level and of any type, including the federal 
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government so long as it maintains obligations under its “external affairs” 
power.58  
Even in countries with explicit environmental constitutional text, courts 
play a key role in interpreting those provisions.  For example, Canadian courts 
have trended toward increasing provincial authority in environmental and 
other regulatory areas,59 whereas Brazilian courts have trended toward 
centralized, national authority.60 
State and provincial constitutional powers must be interpreted as well, 
whether related to the balance of environmental regulatory authority between 
state/provincial and local governments (structural environmental 
constitutionalism) or related to citizen environmental rights (fundamental 
environmental constitutionalism).  A clear example of both structural and 
fundamental environmental constitutionalism arises from a case discussed in 
depth at this symposium, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania.61  In Robinson 
Township, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a statute preempting 
municipalities’ ability to regulate natural gas fracturing (“fracking”) and other 
oil and gas operations out of environmental concern violated the 
Environmental Rights Amendment of the state constitution.62  While the 
amendment in question dealt with fundamental constitutional environmental 
protections, the court’s ruling adjusted the structure of regulatory authority 
over fracking activities since, as discussed in the next section, it found that the 
exercise of legislative preemption under the circumstances violated structural 
mandates of the state constitution.63   
Despite judicial interpretations in Pennsylvania, as of 2012, over 100 
municipalities in the United States had banned fracking activities within their 
borders,64 and other states’ efforts to preempt these policies have been upheld 
by courts.65 Courts in Louisiana and Ohio, for example, have upheld state 
preemption of local government regulation of fracking activities,66 
demonstrating the key role the judiciary plays in the implementation of 
structural environmental constitutionalism. 
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IV.  LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ARISING OUT OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
Structural environmental constitutionalism also manifests in legislative 
attempts to supersede the environmental authority of some other branch of 
government.  This can come in the form of federal regulation preempting state 
and local activities or state regulation preempting local governments.  For 
example, the federal government has preempted the ability of state and local 
governments to require more restrictive standards than federal government for 
controlling air pollution from mobile sources.67  In Metropolitan Taxicab Board of 
Trade v. City of New York, for example, the city of New York attempted to 
mandate fuel efficiency standards for its taxi fleet that were higher than federal 
standards.68  The court ruled that the regulations that attempted to do so were 
preempted by the Clean Air Act and, therefore, were invalid.69  
At the state level, Robinson Township provides a prime example.  Recall that 
the Pennsylvania state government attempted by statute to preempt local 
governments’ ability to regulate natural gas fracturing (“fracking”) and other 
oil and gas operations.70  Though the legislature was ultimately found to be 
unconstitutionally seeking to adjust the structure of environmental 
policymaking, other state legislatures have been able to legislatively make such 
an adjustment—potentially for the worse.71 
Though federal and state preemption occurs through legislative acts, 
preempting legislation clearly arises out of constitutional authority.  Even so, it 
is most directly the legislation rather than the constitution that readjusts the 
balance of environmental policymaking inputs across levels of government. 
 
V.  THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF STRUCTURAL  
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Structural environmental constitutionalism has yet to be integrated into the 
environmental constitutionalism literature, yet there are a number of reasons 
why it should be given greater attention.72  First, and stated most simply, 
properly balancing the structure of environmental policymaking across scales 
of government can create more optimal environmental management, whereas 
imbalances can create a variety of harms.  The dynamic federalism literature 
demonstrates that for structural environmental constitutionalism to be 
adequate, policy inputs at local, state/provincial, and federal levels will achieve 
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better environmental outcomes than siloing off separate regulatory spheres 
between levels of government under a dual federalist model.73  Returning once 
again to our forest example, the constitutional structure of Australian forest 
policy regulatory authority, which as you recall allows inputs at all levels of 
government,74 will more readily legally facilitate the type of forest management 
policy considered optimal by forest policy analysts.75  The dual federal 
structure of United States and Canadian forest policy, on the other hand, can 
lead to suboptimal environmental outcomes in the forest sector.76  
The second reason that structural environmental constitutionalism should 
be given greater attention is that it might have an overall greater practical 
impact than fundamental constitutional provisions, at least at present and until 
fundamental environmental constitutional provisions are taken more seriously 
by more governments.  Both structural changes to constitutions and the 
establishment of fundamental rights within them can come about through 
procedural and political processes.  However, as discussed in Part II(C), J.B. 
Ruhl’s useful matrix assessing the viability of different environmental 
constitutional amendments supports a conclusion that making structural 
changes to how government operates may be more efficacious if ultimately 
achieved—at least at the federal level.77  In other words, using aspirational 
language like that found in the Pennsylvania State Constitution is not likely to 
be very effective in a national constitution like the United States Constitution, 
since the constitutional authority of subnational governments must still be 
contended with and there is a lack of clarity about what these rights mean and 
what obligations the government maintains to carry them out.  On the other 
hand, incorporating a national constitutional provision that declares “the 
federal government shall have the authority to directly regulate land use 
planning” or a state constitutional provision that declares “state governments 
will not interfere with local regulation of oil and gas development activities” 
would provide clear constitutional authority where before it may have been 
uncertain.  Such provisions would further facilitate any political will that exists 
to take action at those levels of government, through a minimum standards 
approach or otherwise. 
Third, and finally, structural environmental constitutionalism may also cure 
some of the ills associated with fundamental environmental constitutionalism.  
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Fundamental environmental constitutional protections may work at the state 
level in Pennsylvania, but what about nationally or at the state level in Brazil, 
India, and elsewhere?  Consider Brazil, which has both fundamental 
environmental constitutional provisions and structural provisions related to 
certain resources, like forests.78  Brazil’s fundamental protections are largely 
disregarded, and “[a]ttempts to embody environmental protection clauses in 
national constitutions, such as Brazil’s, do not appear to have appreciably 
influenced the prevailing bureaucratic culture.”79  At some point, if 
fundamental provisions are in place, but are disregarded for long enough, 
there may be an erosion of institutional legitimacy for any future government 
seeking to actually implement those provisions.  This can devalue the 
constitutional text in practice as governments disregard constitutional 
provisions or court decisions interpreting them.80  If, however, nations can 
make structural adjustments to the allocation of constitutional authority, 
empowering, for example, the local populous through restructuring control 
over forest resources in a more legally decentralized manner, then perhaps 
fundamental environmental constitutional provisions may be taken more 
seriously.  This, of course, would likely require building capacity at local levels, 
increasing enforcement and respect for the rule of law within a nation, among 
a number of other governance adjustments.  Indeed, these adjustments are 
very much needed in nations like Brazil and India.81  Yet, if they can succeed, 
then both structural changes and fundamental constitutional provisions can 
better protect the environment. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
By including an analysis of structural environmental constitutionalism into 
the current canon of environmental constitutionalism scholarship, we can 
identify imbalances in environmental governance authority and how to adjust 
those imbalances, facilitate more immediate practical impacts on 
environmental governance across scales, and lay a firm foundation for other 
forms of environmental constitutionalism, like fundamental.  Failing to see 
environmental governance authority as also a constitutional matter rather than 
merely a political matter can lead to path dependency and the perpetuation of 
institutions that negatively impact environmental governance.  Too often, a 
disproportionate amount of blame is placed on political will for poor 
environmental policy—either poor political will leads to a lack of needed 
policies at certain levels of government or poor political will leads to 
governance institutions incapable of enforcing law on the books.  Obviously, 
political will is a key component to crafting any policy.  Yet political will and 
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legal institutions (like constitutions) are intertwined in a “chicken or egg” 
relationship.  I have often described this problem as legal perception 
informing political reality.  If we do not recognize the legal reality—that is, a 
form of structural environmental constitutionalism that may place 
constitutional constraints on the exercise of environmental regulatory 
authority at particular levels of government—then governments get a free pass 
to continue to politically perceive that they are unable to act on certain 
important environmental subject matter.  The study of structural 
environmental constitutionalism and adjustment of deficient constitutional 
structures will be critical to ensuring that structural deficiencies within 
constitutions do not undermine political will when it is present. 
 
